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is res judicata on the alimony question. The New Jersey statute was probably
designed to prevent such a ruling in that jurisdiction.16 The court avoided the contemplated effect of the lump sum settlement by extending the application of the statute
to the instant case. Other jurisdictions have adopted the opposite view.7 In the absence of statute, these courts place the burden upon the taxpayers upon the theory
that because of the lump sum settlement the wife has no more claim on her former
husband for this minimum support than she has on any other man in the community.'8
Attorney and Client-Reasonable Fee-Factors To Be Considered-[Wisconsin].An attorney, having successfully defended his client in a $48,000 tax suit brought by
the federalgovernment, sought to recover $16,025.o6 in fees on the basis of an oral contingent fee contract. The client, admitting an oral contract, denied any provision
therein for a contingent fee, claiming that the contract was for reasonable value only.
The jury returned a verdict of $14,422.57 for the attorney. On appeal, held, reversed.
The evidence being insufficient to support a contingent fee contract, the attorney is
entitled only to the reasonable value of his services. The jury's verdict, amounting to
$641 a day for 28 days' services, is excessive. The maximum reasonable fee is $5o a
day for office work, $ioo a day for work requiring absence from the office. Podell v.
Gronik.'
Although in England, barristers cannot enforce payment for their services, 2 the
opposite rule is well established in the United States as regards attorneys.3 In computing the amount of compensation to which an attorney is entitled, resort must often
be had to the rather indefinite standard of "reasonable value." The most frequently
occurring situations in which this standard is applied are where legal services are
rendered to a client with no definite fee stipulated4 where the contract of employment
37 Pac. 770 (1894). However, since an alimony provision has, an in personam; operation, such
provision may not properly be incorporated into an ex parte divorce decree where the defendant has only had constructive service. Proctor v. Proctor, 215 11. 275, 74 N.E. 145 (I905);
Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N.Y. 408, 28 N.E. 4o5 (1891); 2 Black, Judgments §§ 925, 933 (1902).
IS That it is resjudicata: Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill.
104, 147 N.E. 659 (1925); Doeksen v.
Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489, 21o N.W. 545 (1926); Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. .55 ('913);
Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S.E. 182 (i9o8); McFarlane v. McFarlane, 43 Ore. 477, 73
Pac. 203 (i9o3); Howell v. Howell, io4 Cal. 45, 37 Pac. 770 (1894). But see Hutton v. Dodge,
58 Utah 228, ig8 Pac. z65 (1921); COx v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869). Also see note io Minn.
L. Rev. 254 (1928) and 4 Wis. L. Rev. 226 (1927).
x6 Other jurisdictions having similar statutes are Massachusetts (Mass. G. L. 1932, c. 208,
§ 34) and Rhode Island. (R.I. G.L. 1923, § 4216).
17 Note 8 supra.
19 See Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill.
290, 294 (z868).

N.W. 53 (Wis. 1938).
v. Brown, 13 C.B. (N.S.) 677 (1863); Turner v. Phillips, i Pea. 166 (1792);
Mowat v. Brown, ig Fed. 87 (C.C. Minn. x884).
Crozier v. Freeman Coal Min. Co., 363 Il]. 362, 2 N.E. (2d) 293 (1936); It re Pitman's
Guardianship, 120 Okla. gg, 250 Pac. zoiS (1926); Taft v. Thomajan, 249 Mass. 299, 144
N.E. 228 (1924).
4 Kline v. Blackwell, 63 F. (2d) 897 (C.C.A. Sth 1933), certiorariden. 29o U.S. 636 (I933);
Page v. Avila, .55 R.I. 52, 177 Ati. 541 (I935); Elconin v. Yalen, 208 Cal. 546, 282 Pac. 791
'282

2Kennedy

(X929); F. L. Stitt & Co. v. Powell, 94 Fla. 55o, 114 So. 375 (1927).

RECENT CASES
is voids and where completion of services to be performed under the contract is prevented by discharge of the attorney or by settlement of the case by the client.6
The problem of determining what amounts to a reasonable fee is usually one for
the jury when the evidence presented is conflicting.7 The court can, however, reduce
the amount awarded if excessive,' or grant a new trial,9 or increase the amount,10 if inadequate. It is in deciding whether certain sums are inadequate, reasonable, or excessive, that the question of what elements should be taken into consideration in establishing a reasonable fee arises.
Rule 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association mentions a number of factors, namely, time spent, difficulty of the question, skill required,
loss of other employment caused by acceptance of the particular case, customary
charges, amount involved, result, contingency or certainty of the fee, and the nature
of the employment-whether casual or for a regular client. In general it may be said
that the courts have applied all of these tests," but that they are so inter-related that
specific consideration is usually confined to the few the courts thinks decisive of the
case at hand.
While the courts take note of the time spent, 2 the fee will not be larger merely because a certain length of time was taken where a diligent lawyer could have performed
the services in a much shorter period.3 Closely associated with both time and the attorney's skill is his experience. One court has said, "There seems to be apparent ....
a notion that any young gentleman two or three years out of the law school has a
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right to charge at the rate of $50 per day for his services, because men of age, experience, and established reputation and capacity to perform much legal work in a day
sometimes, or ordinarily, receive that much. This is not correct.""4
The courts have occasionally lumped the amount involved, the difficulty of the
question, and the time spent, into one concept termed "responsibility imposed."'.s
The amount involved is a factor invariably present in a discussion of reasonable fees.
This is to be expected since when the amount involved is large, more is at stake, the
attorney's concern is greater and more work is done on the case. These results in the
final analysis mean greater responsibility, hence a more substantial fee. Responsibility also refers to the share of the litigation handled by the attorney, 6 i.e., whether he
was the sole counsel or worked in cooperation with others; and to anxiety, such as
would be created by the knowledge that the physical well-being of the client depended
7
upon the outcome of the case.'
The result of the litigation is an important factor. x8 "The law recognizes that the
results accomplished by an attorney for his client constitute a material element in
the value of the legal services."'9 An attorney is not responsible for the success of
litigation;2° thus the fact that litigation results unfavorably to the client does not
prevent recovery of attorney's fees.2 The importance of the result in determining the
fee seems an attempt to cater to the feelings and purse of the client, besides judging
the skill with which the case was presented.
Considerable regard is given to the customary fee." Expert evidence in the person
of attorneys familiar with the customary value of such services as a case may require,
can be resorted to, but such evidence is binding neither on jury nor court when acting
without a jury.'3 Concerning the latter situation it has been observed that since
expert evidence does not bind the jury it certainly should not bind the court because
he himself is an expert'4 Moreover the court may use his own experience in determining what the customary fee is and whether it is reasonable.'s
A dispute exists regarding the admission of evidence intended to reveal the client's
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financial status. Some courts allow such evidence,'26 others refuse it.27 Whenever such
evidence is admitted, it is not for the purpose of enhancing the compensation beyond
28
a reasonable amount, but to ascertain the ability of the client to pay even that sum.
Where the client cannot earn more than ordinary wages the charge should be small as
compared to the usual fee.'9 Obviously there is often a close.relation between the result of the suit and the client's wealth. Even though the result be favorable to the
client, it may mean merely relief from a liability, instead of the acquisition of money
damages, in which case he is less inclined to pay a large attorney's fee and often less
able.
No one of the elements which go to make up a reasonable fee is controlling. All of
these factors are to be regarded and each is given such weight as the trier of fact
thinks appropriate in the particular case under consideration.3o Viewing the fee
awarded in the instant case in the light of these criteria the decision seems correct.
Banks and Banking-Contracts-Unenforceability of Agreement by Bank To
Repurchase Securities Sold-[New York].-The defendant bank, through its vicepresident, orally agreed to repurchase at the original sale price, various securities of
other corporations sold to the plaintiff by the bank, upon demand by the purchaser at
any time during the lifetime of the securities. In an action to recover damages for
breach of this contract, held, for defendant; the repurchase agreement was unenforceable because contrary to public policy. Rothschild v. Manufacturers Trust Co.'
This decision, one of first instance in New York, exemplifies the recent tendency
further to restrict operations of banks which might endanger their stability, 2 and illustrates that the business dealings of banks, being more affected with the public interest than the transactions of other corporations3 may be more readily declared void
because contrary to public policy.4
26 Walker v. Hill, 90 Mont. iii, 300 Pac. 26o (1931); French v. Abbott Publishing Co.,
223 App. Div., 276, 228 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1929).
27Winslow v. Atz, x68 Md. 230, 177 At!. 272 (1935); Nelson v. Auch, 62 N.D. 594, 245 N.W.
81g (1932).
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2 See I Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 749 (i934) for the suggestion that the Federal Securities Act, 48
Stat. 74 (1933), the National Banking Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Act, 48 Stat. 168 (1933), indicate a growing public policy that security selling
should be divorced from the banking business.
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N.Y. Supp. 8o4, 148 Misc. 353 (i933). Where a bank brings suit on a promissory note the
defendant may not plead an agreement by the bank not to enforce the instrument, because he
is charged with knowledge that the note might be used to conceal the actual transaction,
Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N.Y. 192, 5 N.E. (2d) x96 (1936). An assumption
clause in a deed conveying property to a state bank obligating the bank to pay the mortgage
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